The "Hard Problem" for Dualism

MIT's Alex Byrne surveys the philosophical back-and-forth regarding the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness. He ends up sketching a few reasons why the hard problem "may...not [be] so hard after all." I'm with Byrne, but want to add that even if the hard problem proves intractable, it certainly can't stand as an argument in favor of dualism.

The move from the hard problem to dualism relies on the notion that if physicalism is false, we need something nonphysical to account for consciousness. But unless we construe the presumably nonphysical something-we-know-not-what as essentially conscious-making, zombies are every bit as "clearly and distinctly" conceivable even on the dualist's picture.

Consider Al (no relation to Alex Byrne). On the assumptions of dualism, Al comprises or instantiates certain natural properties Φ and certain nonnatural properties Ψ. The dualist postulates that Φ and Ψ are necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness. Yet we can "clearly and distinctly" conceive of zombie-Al, who is a duplicate of Al in respect of both Φ and Ψ, but who is nonetheless phenomenally void.

This means that the zombie argument defeats dualism in just the same way it defeats physicalism. In fact, it would defeat any ontology that isn't stipulated a priori as containing ingredients essential to consciousness.

UPDATE: The above is a reworked version of this post, which was originally entitled "The 'Hard Problem' in Regress." The "regress" parts of the original argument were otiose.