Engaging in colloquy in the comments to the Equable Agnostic's (née Raving Atheist) post here got me to thinking about the moral status of blastocysts and the issue of "potentiality." Blastocysts have the potential to become newborn infants, then toddlers, teens, adults, and so on. Such potential (so the argument goes) is the reason we should view blastocysts as morally significant.
But why are, say, toddlers morally significant? Well, presumably it's not merely because they have the potential to become teens, etc. That is, presumably we take it as a brute fact that toddlers are morally significant. And it's this brute fact that anti-choicers appeal to to justify the moral significance of blastocysts.
It seems, then, that the argument from potential relies on something like the following premise:
(P) Having the potential to become a morally significant organism makes an organism O morally significant.
But if O has the potential to become morally significant, then (by P) it is morally significant--it isn't merely potentially morally significant. But then if it is morally significant, there isn't any need to appeal to its potential in becoming so. So isn't P tautologous, or even incoherent? And is there any other property like that described in P, such that the potential to instantiate it actually instantiates it?
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