It's very hard to sustain through this kind of gross shift in evaluative preferences the notion that there is some immutable value in the film itself apart from whatever anyone thinks about it. What seems more likely is that whether a film strikes us as "good" at any given time is a function of all kinds of cultural and genetic factors, our occurrent knowledge and associations, our fleeting affects.
This concession to the instability of value does not necessarily suggest that value lacks any kind of objective, empirical content. (Perhaps the experience of valuing is a complex function mapping "aesthetic inputs" and prior "taste states" to posterior "evaluative outcomes.") But (at least if filmgoing involves an exemplary or paradigmatic form of valuation) it does suggest that nothing has value simpliciter, or even value-for-x simpliciter. It suggests that a thing can only have value-for-x-at-time-t-under-conditions-c.