You can't derive an "ought" from an Id.
In my last post on ethical relativism, I argued that species categories are vague, and that ethical universalism must therefore be an empirical claim about the contingent constitution of members of Homo sapiens.
Continue reading "Ethical Universalism and the Problem of Natural Moral Variation" »
To the blowfly, horse dung makes a delightful, nourishing meal; to you, horse dung tastes like...well, like what it is -- plus, it might make you sick. In this way, value is species relative.
Continue reading "Species Relativism and Specific Vagueness" »
Consider this description of an imaginary species I'll call Homo atrox:
Homo atrox is in most respects similar to Homo sapiens, but with a far more pronounced disposition toward cruelty. In fact, studies show that atroxians who engage in wanton acts of exquisite cruelty lead substantially longer, happier, more productive lives than those who try to abstain from cruelty. [1]
Conventional ethical relativism appeals to some set of social norms, traditions or practices, or personal convictions as truth-makers or grounds for moral justification. On this model, for any moral precept p, the statement 'p is true' means something like 'I (and/or those of my social group) accept p' -- where such acceptance in the assertor's moral theory (perhaps linked with some anthropological and psychological theses) constitutes the relevant "truth" or justification of p.
Joining a party that started over at Ezra Klein's blog, Hilzoy riffs on the counter-Kripkean implications of Geraldine Ferraro's Obama gaffe: "[I]f I were a black man and had wheels, I would be the first black male trolleycar ever, not to mention the first being ever to be both a public transit vehicle and a mammal."
This is all very witty, of course. Then again, it's also all a bit too easy. After all, look at the fun that could have been had with Michelle Obama's "for the first time I'm proud of America" thoughts. It seems to me that if you actually wanted to be fair about construing Ferraro's woefully inartful remarks, you'd probably wind up with something like this:
Continue reading "Race and Gender as Aristotelian Accidents" »
Quentin Smith, in his paper "Time Was Created by [née 'Began With'] a Timeless Point," gives the following strange argument:
From Ken Worpole's "Dockers & Detectives":
David Papineau reviews John Searle for the TLS. I mention this only as an excuse to point to a "common sense" ('cause Searle is big on common sense) refutation of Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment (well, actually, a refutation of Searle's reply to the systems reply to Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment; still, by extension...). You might call it the "Chinese Kite" thought experiment.
(Via Arts & Letters Daily.)
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