Response from my post yesterday on the "clumps of cells" otherwise known as blastocysts got me to thinking about the argument from potential.
The argument from potential, stripped down, goes like so:
- Persons have a right to life.
- Potential persons should have the same rights as persons.
- A blastocyst is a potential person.
- Therefore, a blastocyst has a right to life.
The second premise (which is often elided) is obviously key to unlocking the argument. Why should "potential" persons have the same rights as persons? Moreover, does anyone actually behave as if that is (or should be) the case?
In each of the following pairs of cellular clumps, and forced to choose between them, on which would you let a sledgehammer fatally (and we shall assume painlessly) fall:
- (a) a sleeping puppy; (b) a frozen human blastocyst in vitro.
- (a) a sleeping human baby; (b) a frozen human blastocyst in vitro.
- (a) a sleeping college student; (b) a frozen human blastocyst in vitro.
I think the vast majority of persons would check (b) in each case--an answer that suggests human blastocysts not only aren't due the rights of persons but don't even enjoy the rights of dogs.
Still, some might select (a) in the first case. Any takers for (a) in either of the other two cases? I doubt it. But even this still suggests that human blastocysts are not due the same set of rights as are persons. And since the dilemmas sketched are of the same structure (and are far more modest in the competing interests lodged against the putative interests of the blastocyst) as similar dilemmas setting the (potential) survival of blastocysts against the (potential) survival of adults suffering from cancer, spinal cord injuries, neurological disorders, etc., the argument from potential fails.
Recent Comments