The "Strange Doctrines" Undercroft

The Impotence of the Argument from Potential

Response from my post yesterday on the "clumps of cells" otherwise known as blastocysts got me to thinking about the argument from potential.

The argument from potential, stripped down, goes like so:

1. Persons have a right to life.
2. Potential persons should have the same rights as persons.
3. A blastocyst is a potential person.
4. Therefore, a blastocyst has a right to life.

The second premise (which is often elided) is obviously key to unlocking the argument. Why should "potential" persons have the same rights as persons? Moreover, does anyone actually behave as if that is (or should be) the case?

In each of the following pairs of cellular clumps, and forced to choose between them, on which would you let a sledgehammer fatally (and we shall assume painlessly) fall:

• (a) a sleeping puppy; (b) a frozen human blastocyst in vitro.
• (a) a sleeping human baby; (b) a frozen human blastocyst in vitro.
• (a) a sleeping college student; (b) a frozen human blastocyst in vitro.

I think the vast majority of persons would check (b) in each case--an answer that suggests human blastocysts not only aren't due the rights of persons but don't even enjoy the rights of dogs.

Still, some might select (a) in the first case. Any takers for (a) in either of the other two cases? I doubt it. But even this still suggests that human blastocysts are not due the same set of rights as are persons.  And since the dilemmas sketched are of the same structure (and are far more modest in the competing interests lodged against the putative interests of the blastocyst) as similar dilemmas setting the (potential) survival of blastocysts against the (potential) survival of adults suffering from cancer, spinal cord injuries, neurological disorders, etc., the argument from potential fails.

Making Sense of "Clumps of Cells"

Robert George (member of the President's Council on Bioethics) on C-SPAN's Washington Journal, responding to an op-ed by Michael Kinsley that describes embryos used for stem cell research as "clumps of cells":

Now, Kinsley refers to the human embryo as a "clump of cells." Uh, well, in a very technical sense that's true--but it's the same sense in which we're all clumps of cells.

Of course, there are many senses in which an organism can be a "clump of cells," so let's narrow the field a bit. Consider the following pairs of cellular clumps:

1. (a) An infant elephant; (b) a cow blastocyst.
2. (a) An infant giraffe; (b) a pig blastocyst.
3. (a) An infant bonobo; (b) a dog blastocyst.
4. (a) An infant ostrich; (b) an ostrich blastocyst.

Now ask yourself: In each pair, which item does (say) a cat blastocyst better sit with?

I would think (but could be wrong) that a vast majority of psychologically normal adults would answer (b) in every case. That's because by the lights of our everyday, commonsense thinking, mammalian blastocysts are more "like" other blastocysts (even those of other species) than they are like mammalian infants (even those of the same species).

But now consider:

5. (a) A human infant; (b) a mouse blastocyst.

If the theory outline above is correct, then (b) is the correct answer here as well. In which case human blastocysts are more like mouse (or cat, pig, cow, ostrich or dog) blastocysts than they are like human infants. But then human blastocysts and human infants are "clumps of cells" in rather different senses, aren't they?

UPDATE: Sundry corrections--including corrections to the previous corrections (previous notice of which I've deleted to reduce clutter). It's drafty in here.

The Phylogeny of Evil

In an L.A. Times op-ed, David Buss argues that for various evolutionary reasons, "we all have the capacity to become murderers."

(Via Neuroethics & Law Blog.)

To Forgive is Hominine

It is, at least, if this article is any indication.

(Via Neuroethics & Law Blog.)

Will, Responsibility and Right Action

(The following is a crossposting of my comment on this post at Philosophy Talk.)

It seems to me that all the concern about free will rides on concern about moral responsibility, which in turn rides on concern about morality in general. What I want to suggest is that even if we give up free will and moral responsibility, we can still have a viable ethics.

As Mr. Fischer pointed out, practical reasoning is forward looking, whereas moral responsibility is backward looking. To the extent that morality is in its essence prospective and action guiding, then, ascriptions of moral responsibility are superfluous.

Moreoever, even if post hoc, third-person moral evaluation were critical to ethics, we still wouldn't need the notion of moral responsibility. We could simply say such-and-such person's action in a given case was "good" or "bad." And that should be good enough for ethics.

Now, one might argue that taking moral responsibility for bad acts is necessary to develop moral attitudes like shame, and that shame (for example) is in fact a critical motivating component in practical reasoning. But there is at least one possible, aretaic response to this claim, which is to say that shame is directed at the weakness of character exposed by in committing a morally bad act, and that shame becomes action guiding by dint of one's will to reform one's character. On this understanding, then, shame is still retrospectively evaluative, but nonetheless independent of the idea of moral responsibility.

If the above sketch is on the right track, we can lose the idea of free will and (therefore) of moral responsibility without subjecting ourselves to any anxiety over whether our doing so will leave our ethics any less robust.

Is Schiavo a Victim of Disability Prejudice?

This Slate brief by Harriet McBryde Johnson is one of the more eloquent, thoughtful entreaties on behalf of keeping Terri Schiavo plugged in. She scores points with this remark:

The whole society has a stake in making sure state courts are not tainted by prejudices, myths, and unfounded fears—like the unthinking horror in mainstream society that transforms feeding tubes into fetish objects, emblematic of broader, deeper fears of disability that sometimes slide from fear to disgust and from disgust to hatred. While we should not assume that disability prejudice tainted the Florida courts, we cannot reasonably assume that it did not.

What's right about this statement is that it defines what no doubt is an authentic problem.

What's wrong about this statement is that it define a problem that isn't in issue: no one is assuming anything about the Schiavo case. This case has received more scrutiny than any of its kind. The result? Not a shred of credible evidence of disability prejudice.

If activists like Johnson wanted a cause celebre, they ought to have chosen a better case--preferably one in which the claims of disability prejudice were at least colorable, and in which hope for recovery weren't based solely on the fantasies of the bereaved.

It's Pronounced "Shy-Voe"

Slate's Dahlia Lithwick has your go-to overview of the nigh-surreal political opportunism in the Schiavo case.

UPDATE: And for the best blog commentary I've read so far, see this post over at Obsidian Wings. (Via Crooked Timber.)

UPDATE: According to the Road to Surfdom, Tom Delay is actually capable of candor on the Schiavo matter. How refreshing.

UPDATE: Blunt thoughts on the matter from Rude Pundit and Pharyngula, who suggest that given Schiavo's insentience we might just as well give her body to the parents to do with it what they will.

Also, Majikthise has a pretty perspicuous summary and substantial debunking of the medical claims involved.

Almost Human

Per William Saletan at Slate, the President's Council on Bioethics isn't too keen on Stanford biologist Bill Hurlbut's plan to "end-run the moral debate over stem cells" by turning off selected genes during cloning so that the resulting entity (whether it is an "embryo" or not is in dispute among members of the PCB) cannot fully develop.

The resistance of many members of the council is expressed in impressionistic, visceral terms like "disgust," "creepy" and "yuck." Were this a group of laypersons, such a reaction would be understandable. As Saletan puts it,

It's in our nature to see the resemblance between an embryo-like being and ourselves. And it's in our dignity to deny that the difference between us and something intrinsically meaningless can be so small, even if it's true.

But this isn't a group of laypersons. This is a group of scholars who supposedly have relevant  bioethical expertise. I'd expect such a group actively to suspend nonrational repugnance at least long enough actually to identify the fundamental issues.

Were they to do so, of course, the discussion would have been very short. For the only "first principle" they have to hang their hat on is potentiality. As the standard argument goes, an entity that has the potential to develop into a living, breathing, thinking human person like you or me in some sense has a right to play out that potential. But Hurlbut's clone has no such potential--and that is by design. Which is to say, Hurlbut's clone is essentially a nonperson, and therefore cannot have any right based on potential personhood.

Ethics Question

An Ohio law student poses the following to the NYT's "ethicist," Randy Cohen:

I am a graduating law student in a state that just passed a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage. To be admitted to the bar, I must take an oath to uphold the state Constitution, but I regard this amendment as discriminatory and immoral and a violation of the U.S. Constitution. I'm eager to practice law, but feeling as I do, would it be ethical to take this oath?

I appreciate this student's thoughtful concern. And no disrespect to Randy Cohen. But why is a law school grad posing a quasi-legal ethics question to a newspaper columnist?

What Antichoice Advocates Have to Believe

Imagine two scenarios:

Scenario 1: Stomping on a newly-laid fertilized chicken egg. Scenario 2: Stomping on the head of a sleeping chick (assume it doesn't feel anything before it dies).

On the identity theory propounded by anti-choice proponents (roughly, the zygote that became you was you), there should be no moral difference between Scenarios 1 and 2. Is this result plausible?¹

¹Answer: No. (Mostly a repost of my comment under The Raving Atheist's post on a related topic .) UPDATE: In the same post linked to above, the Raving Atheist said that "[a]nything can be killed while in that [unconscious] state and never know the difference; all that is lost is the potential." But the "potential" of a nascent zygote to unfold into a sentient being is distinct from the "potential" of an otherwise sentient being to wake up. For one thing, these two types of potential have nontrivially different probabilities of being actualized. For another, they carry with them quite different social implications: one, the loss of a life never seen nor heard from; the other, possibly someone's mother or father, one upon whom the lives of others depend. Or a daughter or son, one with whom family and friends have formed a deep interpersonal relationship. So the idea that snuffing out a zygote is "no different" from snuffing out a sleeping person is not on. Now, I'm not saying that these and other differences are dispositive on the question of a zygote's right to life (such as it is). But it does suggest (I want to say "prove") that a zygote's right to life is substantially less robust than, and therefore subordinate to, that of humans in their later stages of development. (Once again, this is mostly a crossposting of a comment of at TRA's blog.)