Meta and Meta

"Morality" Defined

A morality M_n is a dynamic decision tree intended reliably to lead to the flourishing of an organism O_n (where O_n denotes an individual or a type).

There. Now that that's settled...

The Instability of Value

You've probably had the experience of seeing a film and enjoying it, but then on a subsequent viewing rather disliking it (the film "doesn't hold up"). Or the reverse -- hating the film on the first viewing but then enjoying it in subsequent viewing (you finally "get it").

Ethical Universalism and the Problem of Natural Moral Variation

In my last post on ethical relativism, I argued that species categories are vague, and that ethical universalism must therefore be an empirical claim about the contingent constitution of members of Homo sapiens.

Species Relativism and Specific Vagueness

To the blowfly, horse dung makes a delightful, nourishing meal; to you, horse dung tastes like...well, like what it is -- plus, it might make you sick. In this way, value is species relative.

Atroxious Morality

Consider this description of an imaginary species I'll call Homo atrox:

Homo atrox is in most respects similar to Homo sapiens, but with a far more pronounced disposition toward cruelty. In fact, studies show that atroxians who engage in wanton acts of exquisite cruelty lead substantially longer, happier, more productive lives than those who try to abstain from cruelty. [1]

Reforming Relativism

Conventional ethical relativism appeals to some set of social norms, traditions or practices, or personal convictions as truth-makers or grounds for moral justification. On this model, for any moral precept p, the statement 'p is true' means something like 'I (and/or those of my social group) accept p' -- where such acceptance in the assertor's moral theory (perhaps linked with some anthropological and psychological theses) constitutes the relevant "truth" or justification of p.