Meta and Meta

The Instability of Value

You've probably had the experience of seeing a film and enjoying it, but then on a subsequent viewing rather disliking it (the film "doesn't hold up"). Or the reverse -- hating the film on the first viewing but then enjoying it in subsequent viewing (you finally "get it").

Pity

"Stop feeling sorry for yourself."

To the extent that that's good advice, doesn't it follow that you should stop feeling sorry for others?

69th Philosophers' Carnival

At Possibly Philosophy.

What the "Ought" Problem Really Is

You can't derive  an "ought" from an Id.

Ethical Universalism and the Problem of Natural Moral Variation

In my last post on ethical relativism, I argued that species categories are vague, and that ethical universalism must therefore be an empirical claim about the contingent constitution of members of Homo sapiens.

Species Relativism and Specific Vagueness

To the blowfly, horse dung makes a delightful, nourishing meal; to you, horse dung tastes like...well, like what it is -- plus, it might make you sick. In this way, value is species relative.

Atroxious Morality

Consider this description of an imaginary species I'll call Homo atrox:

Homo atrox is in most respects similar to Homo sapiens, but with a far more pronounced disposition toward cruelty. In fact, studies show that atroxians who engage in wanton acts of exquisite cruelty lead substantially longer, happier, more productive lives than those who try to abstain from cruelty. [1]

Reforming Relativism

Conventional ethical relativism appeals to some set of social norms, traditions or practices, or personal convictions as truth-makers or grounds for moral justification. On this model, for any moral precept p, the statement 'p is true' means something like 'I (and/or those of my social group) accept p' -- where such acceptance in the assertor's moral theory (perhaps linked with some anthropological and psychological theses) constitutes the relevant "truth" or justification of p.

Race and Gender as Aristotelian Accidents

Joining a party that started over at Ezra Klein's blog, Hilzoy riffs on the counter-Kripkean implications of Geraldine Ferraro's Obama gaffe: "[I]f I were a black man and had wheels, I would be the first black male trolleycar ever, not to mention the first being ever to be both a public transit vehicle and a mammal."

This is all very witty, of course. Then again, it's also all a bit too easy. After all, look at the fun that could have been had with Michelle Obama's "for the first time I'm proud of America" thoughts. It seems to me that if you actually wanted to be fair about construing Ferraro's woefully inartful remarks, you'd probably wind up with something like this:

The Cetera Ain't Paribus

Quentin Smith, in his paper "Time Was Created by [née 'Began With'] a Timeless Point," gives the following strange argument: